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1.

INTRODUCTION

The Deepwater Horizon (DWH), an oil rig working for BP on the Macondo
exploration well in the Gulf of Mexico, experienced a gas leak while closing out
the well and subsequently exploded on the evening of April 20, 2010, killing eleven
men and injuring many others. It subsequently burned and sank to the sea floor, and
as a result of the blowout, between 3.26 and 5 million barrels of oil were released
into the waters of the Gulf, becoming the largest accidental marine oil spill in
history.
What followed was a massive response on multiple fronts to contain the well
(which finally succeeded on July 15, 2010). Efforts were made to capture, disperse,
or burn the spilled oil; to protect coastal shorelines with boom and other devices;
and to rescue and treat injured marine and other wildlife. Additionally, scientists
and other personnel were sent out to establish pre-spill baselines, and policymakers
responded with the issuance of new safety rules and a temporary moratorium on
deepwater drilling (that lasted until October 12, 2010).
What also followed was a fairly large research effort to figure out what went
wrong and why. This included work to measure the effects of the spill as well as
forward-looking research to better prepare for and mitigate the effects of future
spills. Funds for these efforts came from many sources, but the largest of these was
BP—who committed to providing $500 million over the course of ten years through
the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (GOMRI)—and the National Science
Foundation (NSF)—which funded over $19 million in rapid-response grants and
just under $10 million in subsequent funding for research directly related to the
DWH spill.
This paper aims to outline what we have learned about the impacts of the DWH
disaster from the economics discipline as well as what effect the DWH disaster has
had on the discipline itself. It appears that what we currently know about the
economic impact of the DWH oil spill is limited, possibly because such analysis is
tied up in the federal Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process
and/or other state-led efforts. There is evidence, however, that the NRDA process
has changed over time to de-emphasize economic valuation of damages (see
Barbier 2011a), meaning that there may not be much NRDA-based economic
research to speak of. Moreover, there is evidence that economists may be producing
fewer outputs as a result of the DWH relative to scholars from other disciplines
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because of an apparent absence of research inputs, i.e. public funding (that is, nonlitigation based, independent research funded by either private or public sources
and carried out by either private or public sources purely for the sake of research),
for economics research related to the DWH. Of the research that has taken place
since the DWH disaster, this paper provides a summary and highlights the main
directions of future research spurred by the DWH. It appears that the most pressing
topic covered thus far in the economics (and related) literature focuses on
addressing the incentives and policies in place to promote a culture of safety in the
offshore oil industry, especially for deepwater drilling. Also, it appears that the
most prominent, and challenging, direction of future research resulting from the
DWH is the expansion of an ecosystems services approach to damage assessment
and marine policy. First, the paper looks back at the Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989
and how it impacted the economics discipline.
2.

LOOKING BACK: THE EXXON VALDEZ

Prior to the DWH disaster in 2010, the Exxon Valdez accident in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, served as the “high-water mark” for marine oil spills in the U.S. It,
along with other oil accidents, led to the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), which changed the rules of the game for the NRDA oil spills process (see
Barbier 2011a for a detailed discussion of the OPA and the NRDA process). The
OPA makes parties releasing oil into the environment liable not only for the cost of
cleaning up those releases, but also for monetary compensation for damages, and
authorizes public trustees to seek recovery of these damages (Barbier 2011a). It
substantially increased spillers’ explicit liability for damages, making them liable
for loss of natural resources, personal property, subsistence use, taxes, royalties,
rents, fees, net profit shares by government entities, profits and earning capacity,
and changes in costs of public services provision. The OPA also established the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund, which may be used to pay for cleanup and damages not
paid for by the spiller, and provides that costs of initiating the NRDA may come
from the fund.
Specific to the field of economics, the Valdez oil spill was a major catalyst (if
not the catalyst) for the exponential growth in non-market valuation research,
specifically stated-preference methods, and especially the contingent valuation
method (CVM), which was at the center of a controversy about whether passive-
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use values were measurable and admissible in court as a legitimate type of damage
(Carson et al. 2003). Specifically, Exxon sponsored a conference featuring research
that concluded that the CVM was unreliable (Hausman 1993). In response, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) commissioned a “Blue
Ribbon” panel, co-chaired by Nobel Prize winners Kenneth Arrow and Robert
Solow, to assess the validity of CVM. The panel concluded that, under the right
conditions, the CVM could provide lost passive-use value estimates that could
serve as a legitimate starting point for litigation (Arrow et al. 1993). Subsequently,
two symposia were put on to address the issue, one by the American Agricultural
Economics Association in 1993 (Carson, Meade, and Smith 1993; Desvousges et
al. 1993; and Randall 1993), and another by the American Economic Association
(AEA) in 1994 (Portney 1994: Hanemann 1994, and Diamond and Hausman 1994).
From this point, stated-preferences research proliferated, building upon the work
conducted prior to Valdez, such as Randall et al. (1974) and Mitchell and Carson
(1989), and eventually led to the growth of the use of choice experiments for nonmarket valuation. Since then, Carson (2011) has documented over 7,500 scholarly
articles on CV, although Carson and Hanemann (2005) point out that most of the
work that followed had more to do with increased demand for comprehensive
benefit-cost assessments than with Valdez.
The DWH disaster reignited the sparks of Valdez, and the most visible and highlevel response in the economics field was a second contingent valuation symposium
sponsored by the AEA in 2012 (Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao 2012; Hausman 2012;
Carson 2012). Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao (2012) provide a balanced view of the
CVM, focusing on four validity criteria (criterion, convergent, construct, and
content). Carson (2012) summarizes the progress made on the CVM since Valdez,
pointing out that many of the issues raised by critics can be directed not only to
contingent valuation data but to market data, as well. He concludes that contingent
valuation remains a practical valuation alternative. Hausman (2012) selectively
reviews the literature since Valdez, fails to find progress since then, and declares
the method “hopeless.” Although the previous two papers offer some
counterarguments to the assertions made by Hausman (2012), they do not provide
specific responses to his arguments. Haab et al. (2013) fill this gap by responding
directly to Hausman’s points regarding hypothetical bias, the divergence between
willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and the lack of scope effects.
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Beyond the second symposium sponsored by the AEA and the response by
Haab et al. (2013), however, the question is whether the DWH has and/or will
invigorate and extend economic valuation research like the Valdez spill did.
Although the papers in the 2012 AEA symposium use this prospect to motivate
their discussions, evidence to the contrary does exist. Unlike the Valdez case, which
was followed by a very public debate regarding the contingent valuation method
that stimulated years of valuation research, no evidence suggests a similar impetus
following the DWH. Barbier (2011a) points out that, prior to the passage of the
OPA, economic valuation of damages was essential to the NRDA process—thus
explaining the heavy emphasis on contingent valuation methods post-Valdez.
Following passage of the act, however, the NRDA process was changed to deemphasize the role of, and need for, economic valuation of damages altogether. In
this way, the legal wrangles over damage compensation as experienced post-Valdez
could be largely avoided. Therefore, if Barbier is right, we may not see many
economic research outputs come out of the NRDA process. Nonetheless, it is
possible that this will shift demand for economic valuation research to those states
pursuing legal compensation separate from, and in addition to, the NRDA process.
We can get some sense of what to expect from efforts outside of the NRDA process
by examining both the kinds and magnitude of research funding provided as a result
of the DWH as well as what can be found in the relative economics literature.
3.

POST-DWH RESEARCH FUNDING

A review of research projects funded by the National Science Foundation since
April 2010 reveals that 168 DWH-focused projects were funded through NSF’s
Rapid Response Research program, with aggregate funding of just over $19
million. To identify such projects, the keyword search terms of “deepwater
horizon”, “bp oil”, “gulf of Mexico oil” and “macondo blowout” were used (see
Table 1 on next page).
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Table 1. National Science Foundation Grants focused on DWH Oil Spill, by NSF Directorate
RAPID
Non-RAPID
NSF
#
#
Directorate Projects
%
Funding
%
Projects
%
Funding
BIO
36
21.4
$4,811,191
25.1
6
10.3
$698,013
CSE
11
6.5
$1,371,014
7.2
3
5.2
$898,492
EHR
1
0.6
$200,000
1.0
4
6.9
$798,438
ENG
GEO
MPS
SBE
Total

31
74
9
6
168

SBE
Projects
Including
Economic
Analysis

0

18.5
44.0
5.4
3.6

$3,589,959
$7,994,257
$910,751
$261,386
$19,138,558

$0

18.8
41.8
4.8
1.4

7
26
9
3
58

0

12.1
44.
15.5
5.2

$916,654
$3,916,663
$2,150,751
$570,322
$9,949,333

%
7.0
9.0
8.0
9.2
39.4
21.6
5.7

$0

Of these, only 6 of the funded projects were categorized under the Directorate
for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences (SBE), with total funding of
$261,386. This number of projects represents 3.6% of the total number of projects
funded and 1.4% of total funding. Only the Directorate for Education and Human
Resources had fewer projects funded and lower funding. Of the 6 SBE projects
funded, two were under the Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, and
sub-categorized under the cultural anthropology program. The remaining 4 came
under the Division of Social and Economic Sciences; of these, 2 were subcategorized under the political science program, and the other two under the
decision, risk, and management science program. These latter two would seem to
be the two most likely to address economic aspects of the oil spill. It turns out,
however, that both are actually focused on nuclear energy: one focuses on how the
DWH disaster affects Americans’ perceptions of and preferences for nuclear
energy, and the other focuses specifically on the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Thus,
it appears that none of NSF’s Rapid Response Research funding went to any
research focused on economic impacts or other economic issues related to the DWH
disaster. Although NSF is obviously distinct from the NRDA process, it is possible
that, perhaps, NSF’s funding decisions were influenced by the shift in emphasis in
the NRDA process away from economic valuation of damages, rendering such
work a low priority, even for NSF.
In addition to Rapid Response Research funding, another 58 NSF projects were
identified as related to the DWH, with aggregate funding of just under $10 million
(see Table 1). Of these 58, three were under the SBE Directorate, which, along with
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the Directorate for Computer & Information Science & Engineering, had the fewest
projects. In terms of funding, SBE had the least. Of these 3 SBE projects, one came
under the Division of Behavioral & Cognitive Sciences, and focused on community
adaptation to changing disasters, and the other two came under the Division of
Social & Economic Sciences. Of these latter two, one examines the effect of the
media on public perceptions of an event, and the other focuses on something called
Ushahidi, which is a method developed for “crowdsourcing” the monitoring of
disasters. While these projects may address important issues pertinent to the DWH,
it appears unlikely that any of these address issues specific to economic impacts,
theory, or methods.
Turning to other federal agencies, a search of grant opportunities on the
Grants.gov website, which encompasses most federal sources of publicallyavailable research funds, the same keyword searches as used above for funding
opportunities since April 2010 resulted in 13 hits, with total estimated funds of just
under $23 million (see Table 2). Closer inspection of these opportunities indicated
that none of these, with the possible exception of the one Economic Development
Agency opportunity, includes economic analysis of any kind 1.
Table 2. Grant Calls for Proposals Listed on Grants.gov by agency (USD)
Agency
BSEE
EDA
EPA
FWS
NIH
NMFS
NPS
# RFPs
Est. Funds

1

1

2

1

1

5

2

5,000,000

?

300,000

31,700

5,300,000

12,000,000

265,107

Econ.
Analysis?

No
Maybe
No
No
No
No*
No
*Only one of the 31 individual MARFIN-funded projects explicitly addresses the DWH
spill, and it does not include economic analysis.

A search of the funded awards database for the four Gulf of Mexico Sea Grant
programs (Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi-Alabama, and Texas) resulted in 30
projects directly related to the DWH oil spill since 2010, with total funding of
$3,693,718 (including Sea Grant, match, and pass-through funds) (NOAA 2014).
1

EDA annual reports include a list of projects funded under all supplemental disaster assistance programs. Of
those listed for the five Gulf states, most appear to be granted to city or county governments for various
construction projects, and those granted to colleges and universities appear to be directed to various
entrepreneurial centers, workforce training programs, etc. So it appears that these funds did not go toward
economic research, per se, but to economic development activities.
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Of these 30 projects, only one appears to include any economic analysis, although
the database shows no actual funding assigned to this project.
Other potential sources of research and/or funding are the individual Gulf states.
As mentioned earlier, the de-emphasis on economic valuation of damages at the
federal level may have the effect of increasing demand for it at the state level. It
appears that at least one of the Gulf states is involved in additional litigation efforts
separate from the NRDA process, and has funded some economics work as part of
that litigation (Larkin, Huffaker and Clouser acknowledge funding from the Office
of Economic and Demographic Research of the Florida Legislature to estimate
economic impacts of the DWH spill in their 2013 study). It is likely that other Gulf
states are doing the same. Based on searches of state websites and publication
archives, as well as personal communications with individuals in these states,
however, only one instance of state funds being directed explicitly for the DWH
spill was found. Neither has the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission
sponsored or conducted any such work.
The lion’s share of research funding related to the DWH, however, is through
the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (GOMRI, see Table 3), which describes
itself as “BP’s commitment to provide $500 million in funding over the course of
10 years for independent scientific research related to the Deepwater Horizon
incident,” (GOMRI 2014).
Table 3. GOMRI Grant Funding by Phase

Funding Phase
Year 1 Block Grants

All Projects
#
Projects
Funding

Projects with Economic Analysis
# Projects

% of Total

Funding

% of
Total

158

$45,000,000

1

0.6%

$149,999

0.3%

RFP I

8

$110,000,000

0

0.0%

$0

0.0%

RFP II

19

$18,500,000

0

0.0%

$0

0.0%

RFP III
Total

17
202

$1,500,000
$175,000,000

0
1

0.0%
0.5%

$0
$149,999

0.0%
0.1%

2

0.1%

Total Personnel

2,269

GOMRI’s first action was to provide $45 million in the form of block grants to
four Gulf state institutions (Florida Institute of Oceanography, Louisiana State
University, Marine Environmental Science Consortium, and Northern Gulf
Institute) and the National Institutes of Health in 2010-2011. Of the 158 individual
research projects undertaken under the auspices of these five entities, only one
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focused on some aspect of the economic impacts of the DWH spill, awarded to a
single researcher in a finance department. No others appear to focus on economic
research of some kind. GOMRI has since released 4 Requests for Proposals (RFPs),
and has funded 3 of them (RFPs I, II, and III). RFP IV closed in mid-2014with
award announcements expected in late 2014. Of the 8 consortia (RFP I) and 36
projects (RFPs II and III) already funded, none appear to address any economic
research questions, and this is supported by the fact that, of the 2,269 individuals
listed on the GOMRI website as personnel involved in one or more GOMRI
projects,
none
appear
to
be
housed
in
an
economics,
applied/environmental/agricultural economics, finance, or business program or
similar outfit, except for the lone faculty member and master’s student carrying out
the one project mentioned earlier (based on a keyword search for “economics” of
all funded project titles and abstracts, as well as one for “economics”, “finance” or
“business” in the contact information for all GOMRI-funded personnel listed on the
GOMRI website). Thus, of the $175 million in funds released thus far by GOMRI,
about one-half of 1% has been directed to economic research of some kind. RFP
IV does appear to open the door to economics research related to the spill, but does
so only as a potential sub-focus under the theme of public health. Theme 5 under
RFP IV addresses the “Impact of oil spills on public health including behavioral,
socioeconomic, environmental risk assessment, community capacity, and other
population health considerations and issues.” The “Q & A” section of the GOMRI
website for RFP IV directs those seeking more information on Theme 5 (the one
that mentions economics) to a summary of a GOMRI workshop held in July 2013.
In that summary, it states:
“At the community level, research topics could focus on community
resilience, cultural/socioeconomic differences, ecosystem services,
modeling, translating and processing scientific information, risk
communication, decision science, community-based participatory research,
ethnographic methods, economic impacts, and community-wide mental
health effects.
At the individual level, research topics could focus on psychological and
physical health, risk management, intervention science, seafood and
occupational safety, and composite exposures.” (GOMRI 2013)
Whether any economic research will come out of RFP IV remains to be seen.
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I turn now to funds directed to the NRDA process itself. A search of the
USASpending.gov site (Office of Management and Budget 2014), which features
a ready-made “Gulf Oil Spill” search prominently on the main page (as of July 7,
2014), it appears that, based simply on project descriptions (e.g., “lost direct and
passive human use values”) and firm names (e.g., containing the word
“economics”), that approximately $319 million have been directed to two private
consulting firms to conduct some kind of economic analysis (the sum of “dollars
obligated” for Industrial Economics, Inc. and Straus Consulting, Inc., comprising
54% of overall spending for the Gulf Oil Spill). However, it is likely that the results
of this research will not become public record, or if it does, it will be quite some
time until it does. Thus, the economic research funded in this way may or may not
become part of the literature accessible to the public and other researchers. Then
again, if Barbier (2011a) is right, then whatever research these funds are supporting
may turn out to be something altogether different.
4. ECONOMICS LITERATURE PERTAINING TO THE DWH:

HOW MUCH IS OUT THERE?
Turning to the “output” side, we find mixed evidence for the quantity of research
publications related to, or resulting from, the DWH spill. A keyword search of
“Deepwater Horizon” in Google Scholar results in 13,300 hits, excluding citations
and patents (see Table 4). The same search with the term “economic”, “economics”,
“economic analysis”, or “economic impact” added to it limits the search to 73%,
41%, 8%, and 6%, respectively, of the original total. Google Scholar also allows
for an “In title only” search. Under this more restricted search, the “Deepwater
Horizon” search yields 788 hits. Adding the various economic terms enumerated
above yields 1.4%, 0.1%, 0.1%, and 0.3% of the original total, respectively. It is
worth noting that the analogous keyword searches for “Exxon Valdez” yields
similar results. So this relative shortage does not appear to be unique to the DWH
spill.
Scopus is an academic index that claims to be “the largest abstract and citation
database of peer-reviewed literature” (Elsevier 2014). A keyword search in Scopus
for “Deepwater Horizon” results in 1,187 hits. If limited to Scopus’s “Social
Sciences & Humanities” subject areas, the result is 265 hits. Of these, only 16 are
in the subcategory “Economics, Econometrics, and Finance”. To give some
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perspective, a keyword search of the term “Exxon Valdez” yields 878 hits. Only
110 of these are in “Social Sciences & Humanities” subject areas, and of these, 24
qualify as articles in the subcategory “Economics, Econometrics, and Finance”.
Table 4. Results of Google Scholar Search

Search Terms
"Exxon Valdez" / "Deepwater
Horizon"

Exxon Valdez
% of
Hits
Total
General Search
25,10
0

Deepwater Horizon
Hits

% of Total

13,30
0

"+ economics"

18,20
0
10,30
0

41%

3,860

29%

"+ economic analysis"

2,120

8%

604

5%

"+ economic impact"

1,610

6%

808

6%

"+ economic"

73%

7,320

55%

In Title only
"Exxon Valdez" / "Deepwater
Horizon"

827

788

"+ economic"

7

0.8%

11

1.4%

"+ economics"

1

0.1%

1

0.1%

"+ economic analysis"

2

0.2%

1

0.1%

"+ economic impact"

1

0.1%

2

0.3%

Similarly, a keyword search for “Deepwater Horizon” in the American
Economic Association’s electronic bibliography database EconLit (AEA 2014),
which indexes over 120 years of economics literature from around the world, results
in 23 hits since 2010, 13 of which are journal articles (see Table 5). If the search is
expanded to include the terms “oil spill” or “Gulf of Mexico oil” as well, then there
are 75 hits, 49 of which are journal articles. However, not all of these address the
DWH spill directly, and some are not actually related at all. By comparison, the
keyword search “Exxon Valdez” yields 32 hits since 1989, 24 of which are
academic journal articles.
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Table 5. Keyword Search Results for EconLit and IDEAS/RePEc since 2010 (1989 for
Valdez)
EconLit

Search Terms

"Deepwater Horizon"
"Deepwater Horizon", "oil
spill", or "Gulf of Mexico
oil"
"Exxon Valdez"

IDEAS / RePEc
Academic
Journal
Total
Articles

Total

Academic Journal
Articles

23

13

37

19

75

49

393

55

32

24

40

31

A keyword search for “Deepwater Horizon” in the IDEAS database of RePEc
(Research Papers in Economics 2014) yields somewhat more hits, in this case 37
since 2010, 19 of which are academic journal articles (see Table 5). Expanding the
search to include the terms “oil spill” or “Gulf of Mexico oil” as well increases the
hits to 393, 55 of which are journal articles. By comparison, “Exxon Valdez” yields
40 hits since 1989, 31 of which are academic journal articles. So, there appears to
be mixed evidence as to the quantity of economics-related output. Relative to other
disciplines, the amount appears very small. However, limiting the search to
economics-focused databases, the quantity of output ranges from a low of 23
publications to a high of 393 2. Furthermore, we should point out that many of the
economic hits cited here are papers that report potential economic impacts or
preliminary assessments of the DWH. We now turn to a summary of the research
issues emerging and contributions already made by the literature found in the
aforementioned searches.
4.1

Economics Literature pertaining to the DWH: Specific Contributions

The bulk of extant literature related to the DWH incident focuses on the incentives
and policies in place to promote a culture of safety in the offshore oil industry,
especially for deepwater drilling. Other areas addressed include impacts on wetland

2

These would include papers such as Aldy (2011); Hanson and Baker (2011); IEM (2010);
Mendelssohn et al. (2012); Oxford Economics (2010); Posadas and Posadas (2013); Sumaila et al.
(2012); and Upton (2011).
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restoration efforts, fisheries, real estate, consumer choice and perceptions of
seafood, and public attitudes on oil production and spills.
4.1.1

Safety in the Offshore Oil Industry

Anderson et al. (2011) address industry safety with particular focus on the Marine
Well Containment Company (MWCC), a consortium aimed at designing and
building a system capable of containing future deepwater spills in the Gulf. They
focus on the roles of liability and regulation as determinants of readiness and the
adequacy of incentives for technological innovation in oil spill containment
technology to keep pace with advances in deepwater drilling capability.
Cohen et al. (2011) discuss the economic and policy forces that affect oil
drilling safety and identify reasons why those forces may or may not be effective.
Concerned that raising liability caps without mandating insurance or increasing
financial responsibility requirements could have little effect on small firms that
would sooner declare bankruptcy, they recommend a liability cap for each well
equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill and require insurance up to the cap.
Cooke, Ross, and Stern (2011) apply the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP)
program, originally developed in response to the Three Mile Island nuclear
meltdown, to the challenges of low-frequency high-consequence events such as the
DWH spill. The ASP approach foregoes in-depth modeling at individual facilities
and uses instead generic event trees to reflect macroscopic design of safety systems.
The approach lacks detail but captures system dependencies missing in
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). They recommend this approach a promising
means of promoting cost-effective, risk-informed oversight on the industry.
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2011) propose a regulatory and liability framework to
encourage parties involved in offshore drilling to take appropriate actions. This
proposal replaces the current structure of a low damages cap coupled with
ineffective regulation with a system that greatly expands the level of liability,
coupled with a tax, to provide incentives for risks beyond the liability limit. They
argue that this system creates strong financial incentives for safety.
Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Cohen (2013) analyze the effect of the number of
inspectors as well as the effect of familiarity between inspector and inspected party
on the severity of sanctions issued. From these results, they estimate the
effectiveness of increasing enforcement on the deterrence of incidents, but find only
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weak evidence that increasing sanction severity increases deterrence.
Muehlenbachs, Cohen, and Gerarden (2014) analyze company-reported incidents
on offshore oil platforms between 1996 and 2010 and find that, controlling for other
factors, each 100 feet of added depth increases the probability of an incident by
8.5%, suggesting the need for increased monitoring of deeper-water platforms.
4.1.2

Wetland Restoration

Barbier (2011a) summarizes the current status of wetland restoration efforts in the
Gulf Coast, particularly in Louisiana, as well as the ecological and economic
challenges to restoration. He highlights the renewed interest in wetland restoration
following both the 2005 hurricanes and the DWH oil spill. He summarizes the
current practice of habitat equivalency analysis (HEA) to carry out compensatory
restoration, and its shortcomings, including the likely main criticism of an HEA:
that it may not provide an accurate reflection of the actual costs and benefits of
compensatory restoration, because it is based on a replacement cost approach to
valuation. The points raised by Barbier are particularly important because they
highlight the potential flaws in an HEA approach, which currently dominates the
NRDA process, and has recently displaced economic valuation as the major
approach for damage assessment. He also addresses the key ecological and
economic issues that must be addressed for wetland restoration to be successful.
With respect to the former, he points out that compensatory damage mitigation,
such as wetland banking and compensatory restoration, depends on the principle of
ecological equivalence, which may not be achieved in practice. With respect to
economics, he points out that the economic literature is severely lacking in terms
of quantifying and assessing the economic benefits of ecosystem restoration,
especially for aquatic ecosystems.
4.1.3

Fisheries

Alvarez et al. (2014) apply a coarser definition of geographical zones to recreational
fishing. This alternative definition still permits substitution between areas
potentially affected by an oil spill that is better suited for spills with a large spatial
extent. They also develop a quasi-real-time measure of impacts using fishery
closure maps that more accurately captures behavioral changes. Asche et al. (2012)
extend the use of time series analysis of market integration to the world market for
shrimp. One of the key findings relevant to the DWH is that they find significant
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evidence of integration in the U.S. shrimp market, suggesting that the economic
losses in 2010 domestic shrimp production – if in fact caused by the DWH spill –
was not likely offset by higher prices; rather imports of farmed shrimp increased to
satisfy demand.
4.1.4

Real Estate

Winkler and Gordon (2013) introduce the use of monthly event dichotomous
variables to measure abnormal property sales volume and prices in a hedonic
pricing model. Epley (2012) applies the “before-and-after” procedure to coastal
Alabama property, relying on market trends shown in the total population of deed
recordings, which allows for the impact of a potential stigma (i.e., an adverse effect
on property value produced by the market’s perception of increased environmental
risk due to contamination) to be estimated.
4.1.5

Household Choice and Perceptions

Several other papers contribute to our understanding of the DWH accident on
household choices and perceptions. Morgan et al. (2013) take advantage of the
natural experiment setting offered by the DWH to extend joint revealed-preference
/ stated-preference models for estimation of both short-term and long-term effects
of the spill on consumer demand for oysters. Hamilton, Safford, and Ulrich (2012)
conducted a survey of Florida and Louisiana households about changes in their
environmental preferences and perceptions as a result of the DWH spill. They found
that one-fourth of respondents said that their environmental views had changed as
a result of the spill. However, the patterns observed tend to reflect differences in
the coastlines that shaped their socioeconomic development, with Louisiana
respondents less likely to support a deepwater moratorium, alternative energy, or
resource conservation.
Farrow and Larson (2012) identify an incremental willingness to pay for news
about the Exxon Valdez spill and argue how this private value associated with
media consumption can be interpreted as a partial measure of social costs for
passive viewers who take no further action beyond news viewing and likely
represent the majority of affected citizens. Lilley and Firestone (2013) conducted
nation-wide household surveys before and after the DWH to compare public
attitudes regarding offshore oil drilling and offshore wind development. They find
that there was a significant drop in support for expanded drilling among coastal
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residents but not others. Other papers published since the DWH spill that address
aspects of the economics of oil spills appear to be motivated not by the DWH
accident, but rather by the 2002 Prestige oil spill in Spain (Alló and Loureiro 2013;
León, Arańa, Hanemann, and Riera 2014; Loureiro and Loomis 2013).

5. EMERGING
RESEARCH
SERVICES VALUATION

DIRECTION:

ECOSYSTEM

We now turn to a discussion of research topics on the frontier that have gained in
prominence as a consequence of the DWH accident. The one that appears to have
gained the most traction is the integration of ecosystem services valuation into the
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process. Boyd (2010) issued a call
for this immediately after the DWH spill occurred, and this theme was expanded
upon greatly in the 2013 report issued by the National Academies (Committee on
the Effects of the Deepwater Horizon Mississippi Canyon-252 Oil Spill on
Ecosystem Services in the Gulf of Mexico), which was influenced heavily by
Barbier (2011a). Scarlett and Boyd (2011) expanded the call for ecosystem services
valuation to existing federal regulations and programs and Barbier (2013) targeted
the call to wetland protection and restoration. These follow on the heels of a
growing number of calls for increased use of an ecosystems-based approach to
resource management (Bagstad et al. 2012; Committee on Assessing and Valuing
the Services of Aquatic and Related Terrestrial Ecosystems 2005; Daily et al.
2009).
The ecosystem services approach differs from traditional valuation approaches
in that it focuses not on the value of the resource itself, but on the value of the
benefits -- the goods and services -- it provides. The 2004 National Academies
report argues that this approach has the potential to change the public’s perceptions
of natural resources and the way agencies manage them, because it “highlights the
ways in which healthy ecosystems support healthy economies.” (p. 1) Barbier
(2011b) argues that it facilitates a focus on competing uses, such as conservation
versus development, and the need to account for the value of ecosystem services to
make efficient choices. Specific to damage assessment, Boyd (2010) argues that
“lost ecosystem goods and services are the right metric to internalize social costs
and make the public whole following a marine pollution or damage incident.” (p.
2).
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Because with an ecosystems services approach the focus is shifted from the
resources themselves to the services provided, it will necessarily change the types
of data collected and the means used to collect them. Barbier (2011b) argues that
an advantage of viewing coastal/marine ecosystems as capital assets capable of
producing goods and services is that it allows application of the standard tools and
analysis developed by natural resource economists for modeling these complex
systems.
Both Boyd (2010) and Barbier (2011a) point out that with most NRDAs,
government trustees have relied on more practical alternatives to the calculation of
actual social costs of pollution such as restoration costs, i.e., the expenditures
necessary to return a damaged resource to its pre-incident status. (The Exxon
Valdez case was a prominent exception, where an extensive contingent-valuation
survey was used to estimate lost passive-use values.)
The key to successful implementation of an ecosystem services approach to
valuation and damage assessment lies in the ability to develop tools capable of
demonstrating and measuring causal links between an event such as an oil spill, an
injury to the ecosystem, the decrease in services provided by the system, and the
value of that decrease. The 2004 National Academies report identifies three major
obstacles to successful implementation of an ecosystem services approach. The first
is the difficulty in establishing a baseline measurement of goods and services
produced by the system just prior to the event. As Boyd (2010) points out in
particular for open-sea oil spills such as the DWH and the Exxon Valdez, the
demonstration of causality between a marine accident and economicallymeaningful service changes may need to be made over large geographic areas and
long time periods. Such relationships are likely to require expensive and dataintensive methods and not likely to be uniform from one location to another.
The second is the difficulty in developing a model that can predict the event’s
impact on the ecosystem and provide defensible estimates of the magnitude of
reduced services. As Barbier (2013) points out, “we often do not know how
variation in ecosystem structure, functions, and processes give rise to the change in
an ecosystem good or service,” (p. 215). Progress is being been made in this regard,
however, including the work of Link, Fulton, and Gamble (2010); Pelletier et al.
(2009); and Rodwell et al. (2002).
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The third is the challenge of establishing capabilities to place economic values
on lost services. As both Barbier (2013) and Börger et al. (2014) point out, revealed
preference methods such as hedonic and travel cost models are not applicable to
many marine ecosystem services, such as those provided by the deep sea, due to a
lack of any direct effect on market behavior from which to infer values. Thus, there
may be a need for greater reliance on valuation estimates from bio-economic
models (e.g., Barbier 2012; Barbier and Lee 2013; Fenichel and Abbott 2014;
Finnoff and Tschirhart 2003a, 2003b; Sanchirico and Mumby 2009), or with the
use of stated-preference methods, such as contingent valuation and choice
experiments (e.g., Bagstad et al. 2012; Bauer, Cyr, and Swallow 2004; Carlsson,
Frykblom, and Liljenstolpe 2003; Holmes et al. 2004; Moore, Holmes, and Bell
2011; Loomis et al. 2000; Petrolia, Interis, and Hwang 2014), or contingent
behavior, although the latter is geared less to valuation. As Börger et al. (2014)
point out, stated-preference methods require careful attention to survey designs to
convey meaningful and understandable descriptions of ecosystem services to the
general public. It also requires that these descriptions be based on meaningful
ecological indicators (Johnston et al. 2012 and Zhao, Johnston, and Schultz 2013).
Barbier (2007) compares the production-function and the expected-damage
approaches and shows that they yield very different valuations of ecosystems than
would be obtained by more typical methods used. He argues that these represent a
significant improvement over current practice.
Barbier (2012) and Barbier and Lee (2013) point to another important
challenge, which is the ability to capture the spatial variability of ecological
production of ecosystem services across specific coastal habitats (such as marsh
and mangroves), as well as the “connectivity” of marine habitats (such as
mangrove-sea grass-coral reefs) in producing ecosystem services. Barbier (2011b)
points out a further challenge: uncertainty about the future values of the services
provided. Values may change over time because preferences may change over time
or because, as our understanding increases about how these complex ecosystems
work, we may come to better appreciate the services provided. Also, continued
growth in coastal populations may lead to irreversible increases in resource
scarcity, leading to higher values.
Other papers point to additional shortcomings in the literature regarding
ecosystem services valuation (Ruckelshaus et al. 2013; Laurans et al. 2013;
Pendleton, Atiyah, and Moorthy 2007), and Börger et al. (2014) and Barbier
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(2011a) point out a shortcoming specific to wetland and marine habitat valuation:
the extremely uneven distribution across habitat types, services, and locations, with
most work being done on near-coast provisioning, regulating, and cultural
(specifically, recreational) services, such as beaches, fisheries, and coastal
properties, and only minimal work on the open ocean and deep sea (e.g., Jobstvogt
et al. 2014; Ressurreicão et al. 2011; Wattage et al. 2011). This lack of
understanding of the deep sea is echoed by the 2013 National Academies report,
particularly because of the recent growth of deepwater oil and gas exploration and
production, and of course, the DWH disaster.

6.

ANOTHER RESEARCH DIRECTION: INJURY TO
REPUTATION AS COMPENSABLE DAMAGE

Another direction of research as a consequence of the DWH spill is one offered by
Larkin, Huffaker, and Clouser (2013), which proposes reduced “place-brand” value
of a state, i.e., injury to its reputation, as a recoverable loss under the OPA damages
category specifying the “loss of profits or impairments of earning capacity due to
the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural
resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.” They propose a model that
interprets a place-brand as a capital asset that generates an income stream by
stimulating demand for regional services, such as Florida’s reputation for highquality natural marine-based resources. Assuming an oil spill impairs the value of
this place-brand, the difference between user and non-user willingness to pay
represents the lost place-brand value during the period of recovery (Larkin,
Huffaker, and Clouser 2013). At the household level, something of this effect is
captured in the work of Winkler and Gordon (2013), who find that oceanfront
condominium prices in Alabama declined not only during the time that health
advisories were in effect, but also after they were lifted, suggesting that there still
existed a high level of uncertainty regarding the future effects of the spill. Very
closely related to this is the issue of liability arising from the deepwater drilling
moratorium. Shavell (2011) raises the very important question of whether BP
should be liable for economic damages to other firms that were unable to operate
due to the moratorium as a consequence of the DWH spill. In this context, it is also
worth noting the irony of a working paper by Barrage, Chyn, and Hastings (2014)
that analyzes how BP’s own efforts prior to the DWH accident to establish and
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maintain a “green” reputation may have softened the blow of “consumer
punishment” of BP afterward.

7.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has summarized the sources and levels of funding for economics
research stemming from the DWH oil spill, the research that has been produced,
and an overview of prominent research topics and directions. Based on these
findings, it appears that relatively little economic research has been funded by the
major sources doling out research funds for the DWH. An immediate question is
why has economics research apparently been under-funded? A reasonable
explanation for why GOMRI has funded very little economics research is that BP
probably does not want to fund research that could be used against it in court. One
could hardly blame them. To fund research as to the biophysical damages is one
thing, but to fund research that has the potential to directly calculate dollar estimates
of damages is another. It seems, though, that some reasonable stipulations could
have been put in place to restrict any economics research to be “forward looking”,
i.e., to be geared toward preventing and preparing for the next oil spill rather than
estimating damages of the current one. Then again, it is possible that even that kind
of research could become a weapon in the hands of the plaintiffs.
A similar rationale may explain why the various state and federal agencies have
not produced much or any economics-related impact reports on the DWH as they
did, for example, after both Hurricanes Katrina/Rita and Sandy. For example,
Louisiana Sea Grant provides links to two economic impact assessments for
Hurricane Katrina (fisheries losses and resource damages) on their website, but
nothing similar for the DWH. Instead, only general descriptions of the NRDA
process are provided. Also, the U.S. Economics and Statistics Administration, a
division of the Department of Commerce, published an impact assessment of
Katrina in 2008 (actually 6 versions of it) (USESA 2008) as well as an economic
impact study a year after Hurricane Sandy (USESA 2013). For the DWH, however,
they issued a report on the impacts of the moratorium, but not on the spill itself.
NOAA-NMFS published reports on fisheries impacts due to Hurricane Katrina
(before DWH) and Hurricane Sandy (after DWH), but the NMFS oil spill site (and
other web searches) brings up no such report for the DWH. Here, too, a reasonable
explanation comes to mind: if mistakes are made on estimating damages after a

Published by Digital Commons @ Center for the Blue Economy, 2014

19

Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 2014, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1

hurricane, there are no real consequences (other than embarrassment for the agency
and researcher), but with an oil spill, getting the numbers right is critical to the
outcome of the NRDA and litigation processes. So state and federal agencies may
not want to stick their neck out at the risk of making a mistake, and instead leave
such work to the “experts” involved in the NRDA process. The problem with this
approach is that it appears that the NRDA process may have moved away from
economic valuation of damages altogether (Barbier 2011a). Only time will tell if
the states have “filled the valuation void” left by the changes in the NRDA process,
or if we will end up with very little economic assessment of the damages due to the
DWH being done at all.
These apparent shortcomings make it all the more troubling that NSF and other
major sources of public research dollars did not fund more work for economics on
the DWH than what it appears to have done up to this point. One would expect NSF
to be relatively independent of the politics of the process, and if an event of
significance merited economic research then they would fund it, regardless of
whether – on the one extreme -- a large amount of funds were already being directed
to the NRDA process for valuation – or on the other extreme – that the NRDA
process had moved away from economic valuation of damages so that little to no
valuation work was being done. Comparing to other significant environmental
events in the recent past, NSF issued quite a bit of research funds for economicsrelated research in response to Hurricane Katrina (38 projects listed under the BCSSBE division out of 302 total projects funded) although for Super-storm Sandy,
NSF appears to have funded only four BCS-SBE projects out of 59 3.
It could be simply that economics research is not viewed as critical relative to
many of the other fields that did receive funding after the DWH. It is true that
economists generally require lower funding levels relative to many of the sciences
that require expensive equipment, ship time, and other costly things. But the
findings reported here indicate differences well beyond accounting for differences
in funding scale. If it is because economics just simply is not perceived as a critical
area of research following such events – or as the shift in the NRDA process
implies, is perceived as something to be avoided altogether -- then the economics
field has its work cut out for it in demonstrating both its importance and its
reliability, not only of estimating the value of damages, but also in making
3

Based on a keyword search for “Katrina” (“Sandy”) since 2005 (2012), and deleting projects for
which project personnel names included Katrina (Sandy).
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investments to push economic theory and methods further so that we are better
prepared to make good policy decisions in the future. It may have been useful had
the economics discipline engaged its leading experts in “setting the stage” for what
is known, what is needed, laying out the key issues, etc., including where theoretical
and methodological advances are needed to better deal with major events like the
DWH. With the exception of the 2012 AEA symposium updating the contingentvaluation debate, however, it appears that none of the major economics or
environmental/natural-resource economics associations or journals organized any
symposia or special issues dedicated to the largest accidental marine oil spill in
history 4. This could be because those individuals most likely to make contributions
were already engaged in the NRDA and other state litigation processes, and thus
unable to contribute. Nevertheless, it seems like an opportunity for the economics
discipline to contribute to the discussion was missed.
Perhaps the best days are ahead. Perhaps some of the remaining $325 million
of GOMRI funds will end up going toward economics research. It is also hoped
that some funding will go toward economics research via the individual state
research centers of excellence mandated to be established using a portion of
RESTORE Act funds. In terms of research outputs, it is hoped that more economic
research has been stimulated by the DWH than what the findings here indicate and
that this research will start to show up in the literature in the coming years. It is
worth noting that it took over ten years for the results of the Carson et al. (2003)
Exxon Valdez contingent valuation study to appear in the refereed journal literature.
Only time will tell the full story of what the field of economics had to say about the
DWH spill and what impact the DWH had on economics.
In the meantime, it appears that there are three priority areas regarding the
economics of large marine oil spills. First, the push to better understand and correct
the incentives faced by the oil and gas sector that affect safety, prevention, and
clean-up in deepwater needs to continue. Second, if it is true that the NRDA process
has moved away from valuation as a means of assessing damages, then the
economics discipline needs to make a convincing argument why that was a bad
idea, and needs to demonstrate why economic valuation techniques need to be
retained as a major part of the process. It appears that the most promising means of
4

The Vanderbilt Law School did sponsor a conference entitled “Rigs, Risks, and Responsibility”,
which featured some very prominent economists, and the contents of which were later published
as a special issue in the Vanderbilt Law Review.
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making this case is by demonstrating the advantages of taking an ecosystem service
valuation approach to natural-resource damage assessment. Third, given that much
of the oil and gas exploration and production activities in the near future will take
place in deepwater, the current shortage of research specific to deepwater marine
resources needs to be addressed. If additional resources in the economics discipline
can be dedicated to addresses these three areas, then we should be in a better
position to both reduce the likelihood of such disasters occurring in the future, and,
if they should occur, to mitigating the effects and better assessing the damages.
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